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GLOBALIZATION, ETHICS, AND THE
WAR ON TERRORISM
MARYANN CUSIMANo Lovw*
"September l1th made ever more clear that globalization
is a reality requiring greater moral scrutiny .... Maintain-
ing a strong military is only one component of our national
security. A much broader, long term understanding of
security is needed."
UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS,
A PASTORAL MESSAGE: LVING WITH FAITH AND
HOPE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH, Nov. 14, 2001.
"What is needed is a network of structures, institutions,
principles and elements of law to help manage in the best
possible way the world's common good, which cannot be
protected only by individual governments."
Archbishop Diarmuid Martin,
Secretary of the Pontifical Council
for Justice and Peace, May 2, 2000.
THE DEBATE: ETHICS AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
Since September 11th, there has been spirited debate over
the ethics of the war on terrorism. A major part of that debate
concerns whetherJust War Tradition (JWT) applies to the war on
terrorism. There are four variants of this argument: the concern
that war against nonstate actors is not covered by JWT; the paci-
fist critique; the argument thatJWT applies, but faces many hur-
dles as the war on terrorism expands beyond Afghanistan; and
the position taken here, that JWT provides necessary but insuffi-
cient insights into the ethics of the war on terrorism. JWT
describes the ethical responsibilities of public authorities for pro-
tecting and defending the common good. But globalization
brings the rise of private power. Critical global trade, transporta-
tion, and communication infrastructure are privately owned and
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operated. Public sector authorities have neither the expertise,
resources, control, nor the access to protect these critical infra-
structure. Private sector actors have the expertise and access but
do not want to use their resources and do not fully accept their
responsibilities for public safety and security functions, for pro-
tecting and defending the common good. Private sector actors
must accept increasing responsibility for protecting and defend-
ing the common good, but JWT delineates only the ethical
responsibilities of government actors. Therefore, attempts to
understand the ethics of this "new kind of war" must go beyondjwr.
While terrorism (the use of violence by nonstate actors
against noncombatants for the purpose of causing fear in order
to achieve political goals) has been around for centuries, the
modern period of globalization changes terrorism. Globalization
is the fast, interdependent, global infrastructure of open econo-
mies, open societies, and open technologies. Globalization facili-
tates the work of terrorists like al Qaeda. Open economies,
societies, and technologies gave al Qaeda the opportunity to take
their complaints to a global stage, to act cheaply at a distance, to
perpetrate greater casualties using interdependent and easily
accessible private sector technologies, and to elicit greater fear by
playing in front of cameras and satellites that broadcast their
actions instantly and globally.1 Does globalization change our
understanding of the ethics of the war on terrorism?
According to the first view, Just War Theory describes the
ethical responsibilities of sovereign states, but the war on terror-
ism entails fighting nonstate actors.2 On September 11th, non-
state actors used non-military means to attack primarily
noncombatant and non-government targets. The al Qaeda ter-
rorist network, the presumed perpetrators, operate across sover-
eign borders with cells in an estimated fifty states. The suicide
bombers, nineteen hijackers representing no state, were Saudis
and Egyptians living in the United States, trained in Afghanistan,
organized and financed in Germany, England, and Spain, with
information and money sent internationally to them from com-
panies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and individu-
als. Al Qaeda's financial network drew from the diamond trade
in Sierra Leone and the Afghan heroin trade, linking the terror-
1. MARYANN CusiMANo LovE, BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: ISSUES FOR A GLOBAL
AGENDA (Wadsworth 2d ed., forthcoming Aug. 2002).
2. Panel Discussion, Just War Tradition and the New War on Terrorism, at Pew
Forum on Religion & Public Life, at http://pewforum.org/publications/
reports/PFJustWar.pdf [hereinafter Panel Discussion], at 9 (quoting David
Saperstein).
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ist network with global crime and drug trafficking networks.3
State leaders denounced the violence. NATO and the OAS
declared the attacks an act of war triggering these mutual
defense pacts, because these treaties consider an attack against
one member state as an attack against all signatories.4 But the
OAS and NATO charters envision attacks and responses by sover-
eign states. The September 11th attacks do not fit that mold, and
so many question JWT's applicability to this "new kind of war."
This argument is easily countered. While earlier versions of
the JWT began with the Greeks and Romans, the Christian
Augustinian tradition of JWT was developed in the fourth cen-
tury,5 long before the modern state system developed with the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. JWT was not originally oriented to
the modern sovereign state system. Further, JWT has often been
applied to nonstate actors, in the form of guerrilla and secession-
ist movements. The United States government has long experi-
ence fighting nonstate actors who targeted noncombatants.
Squabbles with the Barbary pirates, who were supported by
the pasha of Tripoli (present day Libya-even in the 1790s
the United States had poor relations with Libya due to
what was viewed as a form of state-sponsored terrorism),
led to the formation of the U.S. Navy and the beginnings
of the president's ability to commit troops abroad without
a formal declaration of war by Congress.6
From the United States government's efforts to combat the
Barbary pirates to the wars in Vietnam, Bosnia, and Somalia,
using force against nonstate actors is nothing new, and clearly
falls in the purview of JWTT.7 JWT seeks to clarify the ethical
responsibilities of legitimate public authorities to engage in
organized violence, or war. These ethical obligations of states
are not dissolved when the enemy is a nonstate actor.
The second argument thatJWT does not apply to the war on
terrorism is offered by advocates of non-violence. In their view,
3. Douglas Farah, Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade: Sale of Gems From
Sierra Leone Rebels Raised Millions, Sources Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2001, at Al.
4. NATO, NATO Update: Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed, at http://www.
nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/eO02a.htm. See also OAS, Support for the
Measures of Individual and Collective Self-Defense Established in Resolution RC 24/ Res.
1/01, at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/crisis/followe.htm.
5. See generally SArrr AUGUSTINE, THE Crry OF GOD (Thomas Merton
trans., 2000).
6. MARYANN K. CUsIMANo, BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: ISSUES FOR A GLOBAL
AGENDA 15 (2000).
7. See generally JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, MORALITY AND CONTEMPORARY
WARFARE (1999).
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JWT is invalid and therefore should not be applied to the current
war on terrorism. The use of violence only breeds more vio-
lence, and responds to the symptoms rather than addressing the
underlying causes of conflict. For example, Bishop Thomas
Gumbleton of Detroit, Michigan, an avowed pacifist, argues, "We
need to just let go of Just War Theory. It should be put back in
the drawer and the drawer should be locked and we should never
look at it again."8
Christian advocates of non-violence argue that war, no mat-
ter what the circumstances, is not Christ-like. Stanley Hauerwas
notes that Christ's disciples did not rush "back to Galilee and
form the Galilean Liberation Front to save Jesus from being
killed," even though Christ was clearly an innocent and his cruci-
fixion was unjust. Hauerwas asks since "Christians don't develop
theories of 'just adultery.' How is it that we develop theories of
just war, and what does that do to our understanding of what we
mean when we wish one another the peace of Christ?"9
Counter arguments to non-violence are well known.
Hauerwas's critiques, while pithy, presuppose that violence can
never be just or justifiable, and confuse the levels of analysis
between individual behavior and the different moral obligations
of governing authorities. As the Catholic Catechism explains the
argument:
All citizens and all governments are obliged to work for the
avoidance of war. However, "as long as the danger of war
persists and there is no international authority with the
necessary competence and power, governments cannot be
denied the right of lawful self-defense, once all peace
efforts have failed.""'l
Further,
The legitimate defense of persons and societies is not an
exception to the prohibition against the murder of the
innocent that constitutes intentional killing . . . . Love
toward oneself remains a fundamental principle of moral-
ity. Therefore it is legitimate to insist on respect for one's
own right to life. Someone who defends his life is not guilty
of murder even if he is forced to deal his aggressor a lethal
8. Kevin Eckstrom, Catholic Bishops Support War on Terrorism, Urge Restraint,
RELIGIOUS NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 15, 2001.
9. Panel Discussion, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting Stanley Hauerwas).
10. See CATHOLIC CHURCH, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2308
(2d ed., 1997) available at http://www.usccb.org/catechism/text/pt3sect2chpt
2art5.htm [hereinafter CATECHISM] (quoting GAUDIUM ET SPES 79 § 4) (discuss-
ing the Fifth Commandment and the safeguarding of peace).
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blow .... Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a
grave duty for one who is responsible for the lives of
others. The defense of the common good requires that an
unjust aggressor be rendered unable to cause harm. For
this reason, those who legitimately hold authority also have
the right to use arms to repel aggressors against the civil
community entrusted to their responsibility."
JWT is cited as the means to discern the conditions for the
just use of force.' 2 While non-violence is a valid ethical response
for individuals, public authorities charged with protection of the
civilian population have both the right and the obligation to
defend the common good with force in dire situations when all
else fails. '
DOES JUST WAR THEORY APPLY? YES, BUT ..
A third approach argues that the United States's use of force
against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan meets the crite-
ria of Just War Theory, and that "[o]ur nation, in collaboration
with other nations and organizations, has a moral right and a
grave obligation to defend the common good against mass ter-
rorism."14 The al Qaeda network killed innocent noncombatants
on September 1 1th, and threatens to continue to kill, making no
distinctions between combatants and noncombatants. The U.S.
Catholic Bishops-and just war thinkers such as Jean Bethke
Elshtain and James Turner Johnson-argue that the events of
September 1 1th required a military response in accordance with
JWT. 15 Governments have moral responsibilities to act in self-
11. Id. at 2263-65 (discussing the Fifth Commandment and legitimate
defense).
12. See id. at 2309 (discussing the Fifth Commandment and safeguard-
ing of peace).
13. See generally UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, HAR-
VEST OF JUSTICE IS SOWN IN PEACE (1993), available at http://www.usccb.org/
sdwp/harvest.htm [hereinafter HARVEST] (discussing the Christian's call for
peace and the role of government in that process); UNITED STATES CONFERENCE
OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR
RESPONSE (1993), available at http://www.osjspm.org/cst/cp.htm (discussing
the proper response to violence); UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, A PASTORAL MESSAGE: LIVING WITH FAITH AND HOPE AFTER SEPTEMBER
11, 3-4 (2001), available at http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/septll.htm [hereinaf-
ter A PASTORAL MESSAGE]; POPEJOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS (1963), reprinted in
THE GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE 211-18 (Joseph Gremillion ed., 1976) (dis-
cussing the relationship between individuals and public authorities).
14. A PASTORAL MESSAGE, supra note 13, at 3.
15. See Panel Discussion, supra note 2 (reporting the comments of panel-
istsJean Bethke Elshtain and James TurnerJohnson). See alsoJames V. Schall,
On the Justice and Prudence of this War, 51 CATH. U.L. REX'. 1, 1-13 (2001); J.
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defense, in protection of innocents, in protection of the com-
mon good, and in protection of tranquilitas ordinis, the safety and
civic peace which allows citizens to go about their daily lives.
Years of diplomatic and law enforcement efforts to arrest bin
Laden and his network and freeze their financial assets have not
worked. The use of force in Afghanistan was limited and
targeted against combatants, with efforts taken to reduce the suf-
fering and harm caused to Afghan civilians by increasing refugee
and relief aid to the country. Force was undertaken by the
United States government after discussion and agreement by the
President and Congress; the response additionally was sanc-
tioned by our treaty partners, NATO and the OAS, and by the
UN. Thus, most just war theorists argue that the U.S. military
response in Afghanistan to date met key criteria of JWT both ad
bellum and in bello: just cause; right intention; legitimate author-
ity; comparative justice; last resort; probability of success; propor-
tionality; and protection of noncombatants.
Still, the argument thatJWT applies to the war on terrorism,
and that actions so far in Afghanistan meet the criteria of JWT,
leaves many tough questions. Even if the war in Afghanistan has
been entered into and conducted in a manner consistent with
JWT, that does not mean that future fronts in the war on terror-
ism will be conducted in a manner consistent with JWT.
Congress, NATO, the UN, and the OAS all endorsed U.S.
action against the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Osama bin Laden in
Afghanistan. How transferable are these statements? Would the
legitimate authority and right intentions criteria be met if the
war was extended to Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, Iraq?16
Do al Qaeda's or Iraq's actions to acquire-and in the case
of bin Laden, stated intention to use-weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) change the equation at all? Can the right of self-
defense be extended to anticipatory self-defense when terrorists
threaten to use weapons of mass destruction against massive civil-
ian targets, and evidence exists that they have the means to carry
out the threat? Traditional Just War Theory does not allow for
an expansive definition of self-defense, but globalization chal-
lenges that. While terrorism is old, globalization means terrorists
can now act instantly at a distance, amassing greater casualties in
front of a wider audience. The deaths and casualties are not the
Bryan Hehir, S.J., What Can Be Done? What Should be Done? AMERICA, October 8,
2001, at http://www.americapress.org/articles/hehir-terror.htm. Zenit News
Agency, Renowned Moral Theologian Weighs in on Anti-Terrorism Sept. 29, 2001, at
http://www.zenit.org.
16. Antonio F. Perez, The Modern Relevance of Legitimate Authority in the Just
War Tradition, 51 CATH. U.L. REv. 15, 15-26 (2001).
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only losses resulting from massive terrorist attacks. The resultant
fear also causes physical damage and death (in the sarin gas
attacks on the Japanese subway system, most of the casualties
were from fear, from panic, and heart attacks), as well as massive
economic damage. The September 11th attacks caused billions
of dollars worth of damage to the U.S. economy, creating ethical
implications as budgets available to the poor and non-military
programs are now constricted. Some in the Bush Administration
argue if weapons of mass destruction are in the hands of a "shad-
owy network" of terrorists who can use them nearly instantly and
from a distance, decision-makers have a moral responsibility to
undertake preventive military actions. Protecting innocent civil-
ians from grave danger and providing for the common good
demand anticipatory self-defense, and JWT should adapt to
encompass these realities of globalization.
Some just war theorists, like Michael Walzer, agree that pre-
emptive strikes are sometimes permissible if an opponent dem-
onstrates "a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active
preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a gen-
eral situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than
fighting, greatly magnifies the risk."17 Others argue that JWT
precludes such an expansive approach to self-defense precisely
because it is a slippery slope that could be used to justify using
military force precipitously, rather than as a last resort. JWT
begins with a presumption against the use of force, that is only
overcome in rare, extreme circumstances. Prudence, humility,
"a spirit of moderation," and "a culture of restraint," are required
in moral deliberation over the use of force, which may not
square with preemptive strikes.'" Do leaders have to wait until
struck to be able to act in self-defense, or does protection of the
innocent give leaders an obligation to act preemptively? How
"clear and present" must the danger be when the scale, indis-
criminate nature, and lethality of a WMD attack would be severe?
These are the difficult questions JWT must grapple with as the
war on terrorism enters its next stages.
However, there is a fourth argument, a way in which Just
War Theory does not suffice to explain the ethical obligations for
protection of the common good in the war on terrorism. JWT is
a necessary but incomplete portrayal of the moral obligations of
key actors to protect and defend the common good in this new
kind of war. JWT discusses the ethical responsibilities of public
17. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MoRAL ARGUMENT WIrTH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 81 (3d ed. 2000).
18. See HARVEST, supra note 13.
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sector governing authorities, but globalization moves many of
the functions of defending innocents and safeguarding the peace
to the private sector.
A key contribution of JWT is its focus on the actions of the
legitimate governing authorities. It was part of the move, contin-
ued later in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, to de-legitimize
private armies and bands of armed criminals and to centralize
the use of force in the hands of the sovereign. By legitimizing a
monopoly on the use of organized violence for public authori-
ties, while requiring that strict limitations be placed on the cir-
cumstances under which war could be used and how it could be
waged, JWT makes considerable progress toward a vision of
peace to which pacifists also aspire. JWT works to raise the bar of
political practice, restricting the use of war to only legitimate
authorities, restricting the reasons for going to war to only a few
just causes with just intent, and restricting the means by which
war may be waged. The goal of these restrictions is that war will
become less likely, less lethal to noncombatants once waged, and
overall, more justice will be served than if war were not used and
self-defense and protection of the innocent were not under-
taken. Some of the weaknesses of JWT are how to discern and
weigh the varying criteria, and how to avoid a slippery moral
slope which rationalizes or legitimates war. The strengths ofJWT
are that it provides a practical set of criteria for real life decision-
makers to weigh their actions to build the kingdom here and
now.
JWT does not sit on the sidelines of difficult moral choices.
We will always have imperfect justice in this life, rather than the
perfect justice which awaits in the Kingdom. But this imperfec-
tion of our actions does not give us the right to do nothing while
evil works among us, while innocents are killed and we have the
ability to do something to stop it. JWT depends on a key leap of
faith, acknowledging our own limitations with a sense of humility
and prudence, while still attempting to live up to our responsibil-
ities to protect and defend life (even if it means occasionally
using arms). Sometimes God sends angels to protect the inno-
cent from grave evil; mostly God sends us. JWT parallels the Jes-
uit ideal of St. Ignatius Loyola of finding God in all things. JWT
involves a leap of Christian imagination and faith that God could
work through us even in as unlikely an undertaking as war. It
requires us to check desires for vengeance, glory, or greed and
replace these with desires to serve the common good and protect
those who cannot protect themselves.
However, the downside of JWT's focus on the moral respon-
sibilities of public authorities to protect and defend the common
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good is the implication that private actors have no responsibili-
ties for public security functions. If private sector actors build
and maintain the critical infrastructure of global trade, transpor-
tation, and communication, what are their moral responsibilities
to safeguard the public from terrorist attacks? As Pope John
XXIII noted in 1963, in an interdependent world, states are no
longer up to the task of promoting and protecting the universal
common good, especially in the realms of peace and security."
GOING BEYOND JUST WAR THEORY: THE RISE OF PRIVATE POWER
How can JWT be supplemented in a world of globalization,
in which private (not public) authority is on the rise? This is a
new kind of war, notjust because nonstate actors are the belliger-
ents (which is not new), but because private authorities have
important practical responsibilities toward safeguarding the
innocent. JWT is right to focus on the moral responsibilities of
governing authorities, but this approach is incomplete. What are
the moral responsibilities of businesses and private actors in
fighting the war on terrorism? JWT is reactive; it tells decision-
makers what to do last, after all else has failed. JWT provides
moral guidance for what to do in worst-case scenarios, when
innocents have been slaughtered or are endangered, when a
dangerous and determined foe cannot be negotiated with or
deterred, when legitimate governments have their backs to the
wall. JWT does not offer much specific guidance on how to avoid
or prevent worst-case scenarios. (Neither does pacifism for that
matter.) This is not so much a critique of JWT, as we should not
expect a tradition with a narrow focus to cover all aspects of pub-
lic morality, but it does point to the limited writ of a useful and
long-lived approach in understanding the ethics of the current
war on terrorism. JWT applies to the war on terrorism, but while
necessary, it is not sufficient in consideration of the ethics of this
war because private actors have important ethical responsibilities
for the public good in an era of globalization.
This was made clear to me over the past three years, as I
served on the Council on Foreign Relations project on Home-
land Security. We briefed business leaders, policy makers, gov-
ernment officials in the national security bureaucracy,
congressional representatives, civic and academic leaders in
Washington, D.C., New York, Miami, Houston, Los Angeles,
Ottawa, Canada, Port of Spain, Trinidad, and Kingston, Jamaica.
We warned of the vulnerabilities of our trade and transportation
infrastructure to exploitation by terrorists and criminals. My
19. See POPE JOHN XXIII, supra note 13, 131-35.
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"stump speech" line was "terrorists and tourists alike use the
same global infrastructure." We told leaders the question was
not whether an attack would occur, but when. I teach graduate
courses in International Security at the Pentagon. Imagine my
dismay when, on September 11 th, our warnings proved true and
my class found itself studying terrorism while under terrorist
attack.
Our briefings were met with either sympathy or skepticism.
The sympathetic said that they agreed but were powerless to
change the allocation of resources to better respond. The only
new security initiative being funded by government was missile
defense. The Clinton Administration had increased counterter-
rorism measures considerably, but scandals dissipated any politi-
cal capital to do more, and the Bush Administration favored
unilateralism, not multilateral approaches to security. The sym-
pathetic in business argued they could not convince their share-
holders or CEOs to reallocate resources to public security
functions. The skeptics argued that if terrorism was such a clear
and present danger, then why did only nineteen Americans die
in the year 2000 from terrorist attacks? Business leaders, in par-
ticular, argued that the problems were interesting, but not really
their concern. In their view, counterterrorism was the govern-
ment's job, specifically the job of the military and law enforce-
ment. I countered that trade and transportation infrastructure
are largely privately owned and operated. Government cannot
protect critical infrastructure without information, assistance,
and cooperation from the private sector. Interestingly, govern-
ment leaders did not question whether they had a responsibility
to protect and defend the common good, only whether it was
truly endangered. But business leaders questioned whether they
had responsibilities to protect the common good.
Global infrastructures were built for speed and profit, not
security. People and packages now move faster, farther, easier,
and for a lower price than ever before, but at the cost of preven-
tive, multilateral security measures. While attention has been
given to airline security since September l1th, security has not
been adequately addressed in the rest of our transportation and
trade infrastructure, particularly commercial shipping. For
example, while airline passengers have their tweezers and nail
clippers seized at the gates, commercial shipping cargo is loaded
on these same aircraft with virtually no security precautions.
Whether by land, sea, or air, over twenty-one million cargo con-
tainers enter the United States every year. Less than 2% of those
containers are inspected in "needle in the haystack" random
checks by border, customs, or coast guard agents. Manifests are
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still filed in paper, and shippers have up to thirty days after a
container has entered the United States to notify the government
of its content or origins. This is how most illegal drugs enter the
United States, and cargo containers are increasingly used in
human smuggling. If terrorists were to ship and explode a chem-
ical, biological, or nuclear device via container cargo, the U.S.
government would have no prior information to prevent it and
possibly little post-event data to track it. The current system
favors shippers and businesses, who, with few reporting or inspec-
tion requirements, can cheaply speed inventories for just-in-time
delivery and avoid warehousing and storage costs. The shippers
say they have few incentives to change the system and engage in
greater public-private cooperation with government on security
issues. They are not required to do so by law. Their clients, cus-
tomers, and shareholders are concerned more with the bottom
line than security measures. They do not trust government com-
petence or motives. Would information volunteered to the gov-
ernment land in the hands of their competitors or result in
higher tax bills?
Without action by shippers and businesses, however, ter-
rorists can easily exploit the vulnerabilities of global trade and
transportation infrastructure, as they did September l1th. Dr.
Stephen Flynn, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions and a Coast Guard Commander, explains the ease with
which terrorists could smuggle a weapon of mass destruction into
the United States using commercial shipping:
[A] weapon of mass destruction could be loaded into a
container and sent anywhere in the world[.] Osama bin
Laden could have a front company in Karachi, Pakistan,
load a biological agent into a container ultimately destined
for Newark, New Jersey, with virtually no risk that it would
be intercepted. He could use a Pakistani exporter with an
established record of trade in the United States. The
container could then be sent via Singapore or Hong Kong
to mingle with the half a million containers that are han-
dled by each of these ports every month. It could arrive in
the United States via Long Beach or Los Angeles and be
loaded directly onto a railcar or truck for the transconti-
nental trip. Current regulations do not require an
importer to file a cargo manifest with U.S. Customs until
the cargo reaches its "entry" port-in this case, Newark,
2,800 miles of American territory away from where it first
entered the country-and the importer is permitted 30
days's transit time to make the trip to the East Coast. The
container could be diverted or the weapon activated any-
2002]
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where en route, long before its contents were even identi-
fied as having entered the country.20
Unfortunately, this scenario is not science fiction. Businesses
do little to police themselves, and pressure to facilitate trade
means that established shippers receive little scrutiny from gov-
ernment authorities, even though they are easily compromised.
In early January 2002, Federal Express unknowingly shipped a
highly radioactive, 300 pound package, emitting radiation at an
estimated rate of ten rem per hour. In a half hour, a person
exposed to that much radiation would exceed the annual limit
for exposure and within hours would suffer symptoms of radia-
tion poisoning. Even in this case, FedEx officials do not believe
this shows the need for greater security precautions on their part.
A terrorist organization would not have been able to ship danger-
ous materials, the company hypothesized, "because extra precau-
tions would have been taken in the case of an unknown shipper
or recipient. ''2' Why do FedEx and other shippers assume that
terrorists cannot compromise or use legitimate shippers and
businesses as conduits and fronts, the same way that drug smug-
glers currently do?
The response of critical infrastructure owners and operators
to increase security, the increased vigilance of the banking and
financial communities to curtail money laundering, the global
media's decisions about airing the video tapes of Osama bin
Laden, the decisions by pharmaceutical companies concerning
CIPRO production and pricing, the reactions of doctors and hos-
pitals to try to diagnose and halt the spread of anthrax and other
infections-all of these are private sector activities to protect
public safety in the war on terrorism.
CATHOLIC SocIAL TEACHING AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
While ethicists have tackled private sector responsibilities
regarding labor, human rights and the environment, they have
not tackled the issue of private sector responsibilities for protect-
ing and defending public safety, the lives of innocents, and the
common good. Business ethics has a long history. Globalization
has given renewed attention to these efforts to consider the ethi-
cal responsibilities of nonstate actors, from multinational corpo-
rations, to intergovernmental organizations and
nongovernmental organizations. Recent years have seen the
20. Stephen E. Flynn, Beyond Border Control, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 59, 63
(2000).
21. Matthew L. Wald, Fed Ex Shipped a High Radiation Package Without
Knowledge, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 2002 at A22.
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multiplication of codes of conduct for nonstate actors, from the
UN's Global Compact to ISO9000, ISO14000, SA8000, corporate,
IGO and NGO codes of conduct. The multiplication of codes
has itself caused much debate. Will too many codes weaken ethi-
cal behavior, allowing actors to forum-shop for low bar ethical
criteria they can use for public relations effect, to appear to be
addressing problems while ducking ethical scrutiny for their
actions? This criticism has been leveled at Nike regarding work-
ing conditions in Asian factories and at Shell Oil in Nigeria.
Both companies responded to high profile criticism by enacting
voluntary corporate codes of conduct. But how seriously are
these codes implemented, and what are the sanctions if voluntary
codes are not implemented? Yet where are delineation of the ethical
responsibilities for protecting public safety and defending innocents in
these growing codes of conduct for private sector actors? Where are the
criticisms of these codes of conduct for these omissions? Where
are discussions of the private sector's responsibilities to the com-
mon good?
Catholic social teaching can offer useful guidance here.
Catholic social teaching emphasizes the priority of the common
good.22 By this logic, public safety functions should trump nar-
rower concerns of corporate profits. As Pope John Paul II notes,
a globalization of solidarity is needed. Solidarity means standing
in unity, acknowledging the fundamental dignity of all human
life, and seeking authentic human development for all God's
people, not merely material enrichment. Belief in the funda-
mental dignity of all human life also entails our baptismal
responsibility as priests, prophets, and kings, to speak out, and to
speak for those who cannot speak for themselves, including
future generations. Responsible stewardship of all creation,
including the environment, is emphasized. The preferential
option for the poor also signals our obligations to the world's
most vulnerable.
The globalization of finances, the economy, trade and
work must never violate the centrality of the human person
nor the freedom and democracy of peoples .... Globaliza-
tion is a reality present in every area of human life, but it is
a reality which must be managed wisely. Solidarity too
must become globalized.23
22. Pope John XXIII, supra note 13; HARVEST, supra note 13.
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These teachings are particularly important for U.S. business
people. As a wealthy country and as the population of the world
receiving a large share of globalization's benefits, we have greater
responsibilities for protecting and defending the common good.
Because U.S. businesses often have greater resources than many
businesses abroad, we have greater ability to improve the security
of critical global infrastructure, and therefore greater responsi-
bilities to do so. As the parable of the talents instructs, more is
expected from those to whom more is given. The U.S. Catholic
Bishops describe it:
Our nation, as a principal force for economic globaliza-
tion, must do more to spread the benefits of globalization
to all .... We must work for the common good, measured
notjust in economic, political, or security terms, but also in
... all that is needed for a virtuous and spiritual life consis-
tent with authentic human dignity. While our first respon-
sibility is to the common good of our own society, we have
an inescapable obligation to the global common good as
well.24
We cannot remain indifferent or "neutral with respect to that
goal. 25
Fighting this "new kind of war" raises many other ethical
concerns that are beyond the purview of JWT. Hundreds of
Taliban and al Qaeda fighters have been captured in Afghanistan
and sent for detention at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. The United States argues that most are detainees, not
prisoners of war. 26 The United States argues that the detainees
do not meet the criteria for POWs specified in the Geneva Con-
vention, Convention III, Article 4, paragraph 2. They do not
adhere to the conventions of warfare, do not wear uniforms with
insignia clearly displayed, they do not carry their weapons
openly, and they were not subject to a hierarchical chain of com-
mand. However, the definition of POW is more expansive than
merely paragraph 2; Article 4 delineates other categories of per-
sons who fall into the hands of the enemy and are POWs. 27 The
United States argues that since those detained are not POWs,
they are not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conven-
tion, including being returned home after hostilities have ended.
24. A PASTORAL MESSAGE, supra note 13.
25. Id.
26. Steve Vogel, Afghan Prisoners Going to Gray Area: Militay Unsure What
Follows Transfer to U.S. Base in Cuba, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2002, at Al.
27. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
GLOBAlIZATION, ETHICS, AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
If the detainees are being held on suspicion of having committed
crimes, including terrorism and war crimes, surely the charges
against them must be made, and they would be entitled to due
process (whether through a military tribunal or civilian court).
On what ethical basis can captured combatants be incarcerated
indefinitely with no crimes charged against them, and no pros-
pect for return as a POW? Do we want to follow the British exam-
ple in their treatment of suspected IRA terrorists, of forced
confessions, detention without charges, denial of POW status,
and restricted or absent due process?
In order to gain intelligence and access to Afghanistan, the
United States has allied with many countries with extremely poor
human rights records, such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Sudan.
Is it right to support repressive regimes in the fight against ter-
rorist groups?
How does dissatisfaction with globalization help mobilize
sympathy for terrorist groups such as al Qaeda? Does al Qaeda's
rhetoric of the United States as Satan find a sympathetic hearing
among those who feel globalization serves U.S. interests, not
their interests? If perceived or real injustices of globalization
incite violent reactions, then addressing the ethics of globaliza-
tion assumes greater urgency in light of the war on terrorism. If
perceived or real injustices by private sector actors fuels violent
reactions to globalization (for example, belief that Western cor-
porations rule the world), then private sector actors again bear
responsibilities for public safety.
Resources are needed to combat terrorism, at a time when a
recession and tax cuts have left government coffers low. Who
will pay for the war on terrorism, and how? Will poverty pro-
grams be raided in an effort to pay for increased security spend-
ing? Will unemployed workers receive the same government
largesse as large corporations that have already received govern-
ment loan and aid relief?
Will immigrants be restricted from entering the country,
from becoming citizens, or from traveling and communicating
with family? Because terrorist networks operate within civil soci-
ety, who in civil society will bear the brunt of law enforcement
efforts to discover and root out terrorists?
Should terrorists be subject to the death penalty? European
allies are refusing to extradite prisoners to the United States to
stand trial because the Europeans oppose the death penalty.
Members of al Qaeda may seek the death penalty, to be per-
ceived as martyrs at the hands of the "evil" United States, and
thereby win favor for their cause. Beyond the ethics of capital
2002]
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punishment, there are extenuating questions of practical ethics.
Which option will protect and defend more lives? Forgoing the
death penalty keeps prisoners alive who may later cooperate with
law enforcement and reveal important information about terror-
ist networks. After the September 1lth attacks, the convicted al
Qaeda millenium bomber, Ahmed Ressam, provided additional
important information to law enforcement officials about al
Qaeda "sleeper cells" in the United States. However, incarcerat-
ing convicted terrorists may risk additional terrorist attacks.
Israel has frequently suffered attacks by groups demanding the
release of their imprisoned comrades.
The situation may be AOS (all options stink), as some refer
to it.2 But asJWT testifies, ethics apply even in war. We are still
moral beings with ethical responsibilities, even when all options
stink. In fighting the war on terrorism, will we become more like
our opponents than we would like, and less able to address more
long-standing questions of the justice of globalization? If so,
then regardless of JWT's applicability to the use of force in the
Afghan mountains, the war on terrorism might become a very
unjust war overall.
While military force may be necessary in fighting the war on
terrorism, it is not sufficient to render the terrorists unable to
continue to do harm, or to protect and defend the common
good and the lives of innocents. JWT does a good job of describ-
ing the ethical responsibilities of public authorities to protect
public safety and defend innocents. But globalization increases
the ethical responsibilities of private sector actors for protecting
the common good and safeguarding innocents. The war on ter-
rorism illustrates the need for private sector involvement in safe-
guarding public security. Ethicists must pay more attention to
supplementingJWT to provide a fuller understanding of the eth-
ics of the war on terrorism.
28. See generally Michael Howard, What's in a Name?, FOREIGN AFF. 11
(Jan./Feb. 2002).
